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The desire to attain happiness is inescapable for every human being
and, as such, it has always been a central matter of discussion in the history 
of philosophy. Many philosophers advanced different theories and put
forward specific notions of happiness. Some of these call for a positive
account on it (suggesting specific objective practices and strategies in order 
to reach it and even quantify it), others believe it to be a psychological state
of enjoyment and pleasure, others again are inclined to consider happiness
as something unreachable or just as a mere avoidance of suffering. No 
matter how different these interpretations can be, though, all of them have in 
common the shared assumption that everyone wants to be happy in the first
place. 
This work starts from this acknowledgement and it moves forward,
chapter by chapter, trying to critically analyse some of the main accounts on 
happiness that have been developed in the history of philosophy. After 
having outlined these schools of thought and after having presented their 
strengths and the weaknesses, the final part of this dissertation is dedicated 
at trying to give a proper definition of what happiness is (also by pointing 
out what happiness is not) that takes into consideration what was discussed 
before. 
The conclusion of this work points in one direction, which will be
better explained in the main body: only through an honest process of self-
analysis and self-knowledge which can be conducted thanks to a
philosophical attitude can we come to understand that happiness consists in 






       
         
      
     
           
      
        
    
       
        
      
     
      
         
        
     
     
 
       
       
     
         
     








            
      
Introduction.
This work is born with the intention of understanding what the most
important aim in every person’s life is. Despite all the possible different
answers and declinations of it (e.g. to get a good job, to build a family, to 
find love and so on), I believe that if we consider human thoughts and 
behaviors we will have to agree to the fact that they are all driven by a
specific quest, which is the primary cause-giving sense to everyone’s life:
the quest for happiness. This quest (regardless of the specific meaning given 
to this term and the strategy attempted in order to reach it) is something 
inescapable for every single human being. The desire to attain it is pervasive
and it has to be considered as the starting point and the essential horizon of 
every investigation on what a ‘happy life’ means.1 It is clear, though, that
many problems arise with trying to define happiness, inasmuch it is an 
evaluative concept and different interpretations on it can be conceived. 
What is real happiness? How do we reach it? Is happiness something 
objective, that we can meet just by following a practice? Or is it something 
subjective? Is it transitory or permanent? Many philosophers dedicated their 
studies to the attempt to find an answer to these questions, elaborating some
completely different theories on it. 
The decision of focusing this dissertation on these topics comes from
the desire to study how different philosophers dealt with the matter of 
happiness and fulfilment, in order to properly examine them from a
philosophical point of view. The aim of this work is thus to present some of 
the main views on happiness and to critically analyse them in order to 
underline their strengths and weaknesses and to come up with a positive
personal answer on what happiness is. 
1 Arianna Fermani, Vita felice umana: in dialogo con Platone e Aristotele, (Macerata: Eum






        
     
    
      
      
    
        
        
 
    
      
      
  
        
   
       
          
        
     
  
        
        
   





    
       
																																								 																				
           
   
1. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle: the ethical conception of happiness.
The first view on happiness I would like to analyse in this work is
the one related to a moral conception and to a certain notion of virtue. 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are supporters of this view, even though their 
opinions differ on some aspects. Since Socrates was Plato’s teacher and so 
was Plato for Aristotle, we can try to orient ourselves in the development of 
their ideas keeping in mind that they are all closely bound together. For 
what concerns the first two, it is sometimes even difficult to distinguish 
one’s conception from the other, because Socrates did not write anything:
all we know about his thought was mainly written by Plato.
Before coming to analyse their views on happiness, it is necessary to 
properly explain what the three of them meant by it. The word used to 
express it is eudaimonia (eu means ‘good’ and daimōn ‘spirit’), that should 
be translated as ‘human flourishing’, fulfilment, rather than merely 
‘happiness’ as some might intend it nowadays (a subjective psychological
and temporary state of enjoyment). Eudaimonia is intended by the Greek 
philosophers as the good life, the ideal life for human beings, and therefore
it cannot be just a mental state: it requires more than that. In their theories, 
happiness is not something subjective either, but, rather, it is objective, a
conception that provides an ideal standard to be met. Hence, only those who 
will put these standards into practice will be truly and fully happy.2 
There is not a proper translation of the term eudaimonia in the
English vocabulary: it is thus important to specify that every time I will
mention the world ‘happiness’ in this chapter, I will refer to eudaimonia. 
Given these coordinates, I will briefly show the three accounts on happiness, 
highlighting the main differences. 
Socrates
Socrates was very much concerned with the quest for eudaimonia, 
remarking that every individual wants to be happy and searches what is
2 Richard Kraut, ‘The Peculiar Function of Human Beings’, in Canadian Journal of




       
    
     
   
      
       
      
      
      
         
      
        
      
       
     
     
          
     
        
  
        
 
       
            
      
      
         
       
    
       
																																								 																				
         
  
             
                
          
         
good in the first instance. Eudaimonia is therefore everyone’s goal, it is an 
unconditional good. In trying to define it, the Athenian philosopher starts
underlying the centrality of philosophical research as the only possible way 
to reach a certain knowledge on virtue, on the good and, consequently, 
happiness.3 The path of knowledge starts with the awareness of knowing to 
know nothing: from this position we are freed from any kind of 
preconceptions. The problem is that, even though Socrates talks about
‘good’ and knowledge many times, he never gives us a specific definition of 
these terms, neither does he explain specifically how these would contribute
to happiness.4 He only talks about a link between taking care of the soul (the
true self of every individual and the source of rationality) and the virtuous
life. It seems that in the sentence ‘know yourself’ Socrates wanted to argue
that, in the effort of prioritizing the soul,5 one can intuitively come to 
comprehend what is good for it (and, expanding this concept, this must be
also good for others). When one perceives this, one cannot avoid pursuing it
and cannot act badly. According to Socrates, those who act badly do not do 
that out of meanness, but because they ignore what is good: this is nothing 
but a cognitive failure.6 Hence, the strong relationship between knowledge, 
virtue and happiness emerges clearly. Virtue consists in applying in the best
way possible our own capabilities using our capacity of reasoning, and 
eudaimonia is the result arising from a rational behavior prompted towards
virtue. 
It is significant to underline that, although Socrates considers the
cure of the soul more important than the cure of the body, at the same time
he does recognise the importance of passions, emotions and pleasures. 
However, everyone must remember that there is a priority order for which 
the goods one ought to give priority to are the ones related to the soul. Only 
with the employment of wisdom we can value which desires are worth 
being satisfied and which can be harmful. We can say, then, that happiness
does not depend on external goods (richness, power, health), but it depends
3 M. M. Sassi, Indagine su Socrate, persona, filosofo, cittadino, (Torino: Einaudi, 2015), 
pp. 84-90.
4 George Klosko, ‘Socrates on Goods and Happiness’, in History of Philosophy Quarterly , 
Vol. 4, No. 3, Plato and Aristotle Issue (University of Illinois Press, Jul., 1987), p. 255.
5 M. M. Sassi, Indagine su Socrate, persona, filosofo, cittadino.




       
         
       
    
         
       





       
      
         
     
        
    
 
     
   
 
     
       
       
     
 
        
       
       
       
																																								 																				
          
  
            
        
 
on how these potential goods are used. If they are used properly, they can be
beneficial, but they are not necessarily so: that is why they are not absolute
goods, but conditional goods.7 Instead, what is truly good is always and 
necessarily good and beneficial (as, for example, living a virtuous life). 
‘The main causal claim is that only the presence of knowledge renders weak 
goods necessarily beneficial’.8 That is to say, happiness is possible through 
the enjoyment that results from a proper use of instrumental goods, thanks
to the employment of wisdom, which is identified with virtue itself.
Plato
Plato is our chief source for the Socratic theories, as Socrates did not
write anything, preferring the oral lecture. The Athenian teacher is always
present in Plato’s dialogues as a character, and that sometimes makes it
difficult to distinguish their thoughts. Nevertheless, we can come to outline
some important dissimilarities between the two. We can assume that in the
early dialogues (Apology of Socrates, Crito, Lysis, Protagoras and Meno) 
Plato stuck with Socrates’ ideas, presenting them and mainly agreeing to 
them, while in the middle and late dialogues (Phaedo, Symposium, 
Republic, Cratylus, Phaedrus, Timaeus and so on) he disclosed his own 
philosophical theories, drifting apart from those of his teacher.
The first thing to say is that for Plato ‘happiness or well-being 
(eudaimonia) is the highest aim of moral thought and conduct, and the
virtues (aretê: ‘excellence’) are the requisite skills and dispositions needed 
to attain it’.9 From this assumption, we can move forward trying to better 
explain what, for him, can result in making a man happy. 
Plato considers the soul as the true self of every individual but, on 
this matter, some differences in respect of Socrates must be taken into 
consideration. It is in particular in the Republic that Plato differentiates his
view, presenting a diverse theory of the soul as not unitary anymore, but
7 George Klosko, ‘Socrates on Goods and Happiness’, p. 251.
8 ibid., p. 252.
9 Dorothea Frede, ‘Plato’s Ethics: An Overview’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy





        
        
       
   
        
      
         
         
        
    
           
    
      
      
         
 
        
      
     
     
         
       
      
  
     
      
     
																																								 																				
       
      
  
             
        
 
               
        
  
    
          
    
tripartite into reason, spirit and appetite.10 The rational part of the soul aims 
at the theoretical knowledge of the Truth and guides man into a moral
conduct through ethical values. The spirit is constituted by the aggressive
and reactive principle, linked to passions, keen on getting into temper; this
part can also be a generous animosity aspiring to glory.11 The appetite is
connected to bodily sensations and desires. This division of the soul in three
parts12 explains why a man can be exposed to different forces at the same
time (e.g. I can be trying to make a right decision, but be very hungry at the
same time). That is why, in Plato’s view, even those who know what is good 
can act badly, because being driven by other impulses.13 Thus, for a person 
to live a virtuous life, reason must be able to rule the appetitive part
completely, controlling and overcoming passions through the support of the
spirited part. When this occurs, harmony in the soul is generated and the
subject can live a just and happy life. In fact, according to Plato, virtue is
nothing but the dominium of the rational part on the appetitive part (reached 
through wisdom, temperance, courage and justice).14 
Moreover, Plato adds that it is necessary for a man to live in a State
where the same harmony between the parts (philosophers-rulers, the
guardians and the producers) takes place. Nobody can by happy in a
disordered society: the dimension of collectivity in a well-ruled State is
fundamental.15 Justice is the result arising from the harmony in one’s soul
and in society, when all the parts of the State accomplish their duties and the
citizens behave morally, guided by philosophers (the only ones who get
access to objective truths).16 
To grasp what Plato meant by objective truths it is essential to 
briefly explain his theory of Forms. First of all, if we are to get some
knowledge, we can only rely on our reason, as our senses are liable to fail. 
10 Plato, The Republic, translated by Tom Griffith, ed. by G. R. F. Ferrari, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 111-144.
11 ibid.
12 Hendrik Lorenz, ‘Ancient Theories of Soul’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ancient-soul/>.
13 Terence Irwin, ‘Plato’, in The Development of Ethics: Volume 1: From Socrates to the
Reformation, (Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011), p. 76.
14 ibid., p. 84.
15 Plato, The Republic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 55.





     
      
      
     
        
      
    
       
       
      
         
            
          
       
       
         
   
        
          
       
       
      
       
          





      
    
      
																																								 																				
            
            
    
Men can see only the world of appearance and they formulate beliefs
according to particular things around them, but this is an illusory
knowledge. For true knowledge (episteme) to be possible, it is indispensable
to assume something to be permanent, changeless, objective: the Forms. The
Forms represent the invariable model through which the other entities are
conceivable. They are innate in every soul, since before bodily birth the soul
could contemplate them; then, because of the deception of senses, men 
forgot about them. Only philosophers can come to fathom real things again 
and get to true knowledge. The superior Form that makes knowledge
possible, enlightening and causing all others Forms to be, is the Form of 
Good, a transcendent principle. ‘We have just seen that each Form of X is
the best X there can be. So the Form of Form-ness must be the Form of the
property of being best – which is to say, it must be the Form of the Good’.17 
Once philosophers intuitively grasp the Form of the Good, they are able to 
identify and indicate the absolute norms for the moral conduct, both 
individual and public. These objective norms are the guidelines to a virtuous
life and to achieve eudaimonia. 
For Plato there are two kinds of happiness: the one reachable in this
life and the one reachable only after physical death. The first one is a
practical happiness, that is attained when the individuals are able to 
establish harmony between the parts of the soul and can be extended in the
State. The second kind of happiness is a contemplative one, accessible only 
to those who, in the mortal life, got to such an elevated level of psychic
purity that in the life after death will be able to contemplate forever the real
Good. ‘The real self is the intellect, which can achieve its full potential only 
when it is freed from the shackles of the body’.18 
Aristotle
Socrates and Plato opened up the path that leads us directly to 
Aristotle. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, starts his philosophical
investigation arguing that the good ‘has been aptly described as that at
17 Nickolas Pappas, Plato and the Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 103.
C.C.V. Taylor, ‘Plato on Rationality and Happiness’, in Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: 





     
    
          
        
       
      
      
       
    
 
        
       
       
         
        
 
    
      
     
       
  
  
        
      
   
        
         
      
      
        
         
																																								 																				
       
    
  
              
 
which everything aims’;19 however, he differentiates his conception of ‘the
good’ from Plato’s. For Aristotle, in fact, the good exists ontologically both 
as a single divine entity (the God that guaranties the movement of
everything) and as a concept present in every single thing, not as a common 
universal. The good is inherent in all the categories, namely in all those
concepts that are part of knowledge (substance, quality, quantity, time and 
so on).20 Everything has in itself the sense of its existence, and therefore
Plato’s world of Forms does not exist. Believing in the world of Forms as
the only true world would mean to be referring to an abstract reality, 
meaningless for our life and our actions in this world. 
From this premise Aristotle moves on with the question of what the
ultimate purpose of our existence as human beings is. As for his
predecessors, for him as well eudaimonia is the greatest goal: ‘this is an end 
that we pursue for its own sake and for the sake of which we pursue
everything else’.21 Happiness is thus self-sufficient and perfect, it is the
ultimate end of our actions and therefore it involves human activity. 
The starting point of our study in order to properly define Aristotle’s
happiness is his conception of men’s soul. The philosopher starts catching 
up on Plato’s theories, but he ends up coming to different conclusions. 
According to Aristotle, man’s soul is divided in two parts: the rational part
(divided itself into scientific/theoretical, related to eternal and unchangeable
things, and calculative/deliberative, related to decisions to make in order to 
control the impulses of the irrational part) and the irrational part (divided  
into vegetative, responsible for the activities that we share with plants, and 
appetitive, linked to desires and sensations). Animals and plants only 
participate in the irrational part, so their nature is on a lower level. The more
complex nature of the human beings allows them to conduct a moral life
guided by reason, that will lead them to the complete and choice-worthy
end: happiness. Only ethical rules can truly fulfil human nature. As we
might understand, the appetitive part of the soul is considered irrational, but
it is somehow linked to the rational part, as it can be guided by it. Desires
19 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by Roger Crisp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), p. 3.
20 ibid., p. 8.
21 Irwin, ‘Aristotle: Happiness’, in The Development of Ethics: Volume 1: From Socrates to




          
         
         
        
      
        
       
       
 
     
       
           
     
        
        
   
 
          
           
           
       
 
 
           
        
      
    
    
      
     
 
																																								 																				
             
           
  
    
      
           
   
and passions are the origin of the motion of the soul that tries to orientate its
action towards the object of the desire. The wise man must thus moderate
and orientate them towards the right choice, which is in the Golden Mean,22 
but not annihilate them. This means that virtue, according to Aristotle, is
always to find a balance between the two extremes of excess and deficiency. 
Virtue depends on our behavior in the face of passions: it is the disposition 
that orientates the choice, and it can be educated thanks to repeated right
choices. ‘The human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance
with virtue’.23 
Virtuous activity is therefore necessary for eudaimonia, but not
sufficient to obtain it. Aristotle rejects the Cynic position for which virtue is
identical to happiness: happiness is a composite end. There are some goods
(like honor, friendship, wealth and health) the lack of which does not allow 
a complete fulfillment. Aristotle dedicates a part of the Nicomachean Ethics
to talk about those who are virtuous men, but do not possess external goods, 
or suffer from awful misfortunes or diseases. 
If we identify happiness with virtue, we must claim that someone
can be happy when he is asleep or when he is suffering terrible
misfortunes. Aristotle thinks we will agree that this is an absurd claim 
because both conditions prevent rational activity […], that is essential to
happiness.24 
Aristotle does not claim that a man is just happy or unhappy: there
are middle ways. These people do suffer sorrows that obscure the
achievement of complete beatitude, but still, they can share some part of 
happiness in living a noble life, trying to bear their sufferings. ‘Nevertheless
[…] Aristotle’s ideal for humans, eudaimonia, requires virtuous activity and 
certain other goods in a necessary conjunction’.25 Those who act virtuously
and are blessed with certain external goods can be truly happy and find 
consequent pleasure in living this kind of life.
22 Richard Kraut, ‘The Doctrine of the Mean’, in ‘Aristotle’s Ethics’, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/aristotle-ethics/>.
23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 12
24 Irwin, ‘Aristotle: Happiness’, p. 128.





     
           
      
       
     
          
     
        
     
    
       
   
        
      








     
      
     
    
       
       
 
 
     
         
 
     
																																								 																				
   	
Aristotle conceives, as Plato, two kinds of happiness. The practical
happiness is achieved when the rational part of the soul is able to control the
other part fully fulfilling its potential, developing all the moral virtues in an 
excellent and equal way. This kind of happiness needs also external goods
that must never be either in excess or deficiency. Through reason and habit
men must try to pose ethical norms that allow them to guarantee a peaceful
life in the polis. Contemplative happiness can be achieved only by 
philosophers, that are able to strengthen intellectual virtues in order to reach 
perfect wisdom and contemplation of what is eternal. Philosophers, through 
theoretical activity, can grasp the divine, becoming much less subjected to 
physical needs and linked to external goods. Contemplative happiness is
thus a kind of perfect beatitude.26 
The difference with Plato here is that for him true happiness could 
only be reached after death, while for Aristotle contemplative happiness is
fully reachable in this life (dead people cannot carry out any activities, and 
happiness implies activity). 
2. Considerations on Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’s accounts on
happiness.
Even though these philosophers outlined very well-developed 
accounts on eudaimonia, and their aim is remarkable, I am of the opinion 
that their notion of happiness is not thorough. With this I do not intend to 
affirm that their interpretations are completely erroneous: I personally 
concur with many of their theorizations. However, my thought is that their 
views are somehow limited and thus not sufficient in order to properly guide
us into living an actual happy life. I will present below the aspects I 
recognise as efficient, followed by those I do not entirely share.
First and foremost, the reason why I have decided to focus my 
dissertation on happiness is that this is a topic which has always captured 
my attention. Every person I met, every situation I found myself in, besides
my own personal feeling, confirmed that everyone is looking for happiness




        
      
        
     
    
        
     
     
       
     
     
     
       
     
    
 
   
      
       
   
       
       
        
     
     
       
       
      
        
         
        
       
																																								 																				
          
   
in the first instance. Happiness is the absolute end everyone wants to reach 
and it is desired in itself, it is self-sufficient. Taken this for granted, if we
are to define what we call ‘happiness’, I reckon this cannot possibly be
interpreted as enjoyment or as a temporary state of pleasure. Believing so 
would contradict the former assumption, inasmuch as pleasure and 
enjoyment are not self-sufficient lasting ends. Enjoyment does not satisfy us
entirely, and pleasure often leaves us with nothing but the craving of 
experiencing it again. This is why the ancient Greek conception of 
eudaimonia as human flourishing is what is closer to the idea of happiness
as a state of fulfilment, which is, I believe, what everyone actually desires. I 
am convinced that a long path of self-knowledge is required in order to 
understand what happiness is. Only those who develop a critical approach 
when confronted with important matters can come close to get a possible
answer. Even though I do not agree with their positions entirely, I believe
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle have the merit of having drawn better than 
anyone else what happiness can be, at least in theory. 
Another conception I find particularly adequate is Aristotle’s
explanation of happiness as a composite of different elements. I do not think 
for someone to be virtuous would be a sufficient condition in order to be
fully happy. In arguing so I am especially referring to some theorizations on 
Socrates’ view that, in my opinion, are wrong. It is important to point out
that there can be disagreements on Socrates’ views, because he did not
develop a moral theory in a systematic way, and some notions seem to be
contradictory or are too vague. Some argue, in fact, that Socrates meant
virtue as necessary and sufficient for achieving happiness. ‘In the Crito
Socrates says that “living well” (eu zēn) - which is synonymous with “living 
happily” – “living honorably” and “living justly” are the same thing 
(tauton)’.27 This would imply that a virtuous person subjected to an injustice
is happy no matter what.28 This seems to me somewhat extreme. Perhaps, it
would be more precise to claim that to be subjected to an injustice does not
damage the person’s soul, but cannot either secure a full happiness. As 
Aristotle argues, this does not signify that a person subjected to misfortunes
27 George Klosko, ‘Socrates on Goods and Happiness’, p. 253.




          
     
     
  
    
    
        
       
        
     
       
        
 
 
      
     
 
    
       
      
       
        
     
        
          
        
 
        
           
       
           
       
         
     
is bound to be unhappy: it means that his happiness would be fuller if he
could have avoided that undesirable condition. Therefore, I believe it would 
be better to agree to a wider idea of eudaimonia, for which even the so-
called ‘weak goods’ can contribute.
Another vision I agree with is that, in order to find happiness as
individuals, it is necessary to find harmony in the State, in the community. 
To give an example, it will be enough to think about the Nazi society: could 
a person fully aware of what was going on feel inwardly happy? I do not
think so. We cannot be individually happy when we believe the system we
are in is completely wrong and outrageous for some other people. We
cannot be fulfilled living in a state of tyranny, in a context where our 
freedom is limited. In a bad society people can try to live the best life
possible, but they will be dissatisfied until the situation will change. 
I will now explore the reasons why I believe Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle’s theorization of eudaimonia is not an exhaustive account for 
happiness.
First of all, I do agree with Plato in denying the Socratic notion of 
‘cognitive failure’. As Plato states, there are impulses which push us into
deliberately choosing what we know or believe to be wrong. Therefore, the
knowledge of what is good does not prevent from acting badly. Even so, 
though, I do not quite follow Plato’s consequent theorization. As we have
seen, Plato starts from this consideration in order to delineate a division of 
the soul in three parts, in which he clearly points out the inferiority of the
irrational part of the soul. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave sends the clear 
message that it is necessary to go beyond the illusory world of the senses in 
order to reach true knowledge. 
It is actually true that sometimes senses and instincts are deceiving, 
but can we say it is always like that? When I feel that I love reading a book, 
for instance, maybe this is telling me that I have a passion for literature. If I 
fall in love with a man, maybe this is telling me he is the right person to 
share my life with. Of course, it does happen these impulses are mistaken, 
but it is not always the case: they can even indicate our genuine desires, 




       
        
      
        
      
         
      
         
    
      
   
     
    
      
         
       
       
    
 
    
     
       
         
             
      
    
      
           
          
       
        
																																								 																				
           
     
Moreover, the senses are the only means through which one can perceive
and know the world and other people. Thus, it seems to me the senses are
indeed a source of a certain kind of knowledge, instead of a mere deceptive
entity (as Drew Leder argues in his book The absent body).29 And even 
though I believed senses were completely defective, yet it is the reality 
perceived by senses the only one I am in. What is the use of relying on a
‘beyond-world’, when it is so far from our direct perception? I agree with 
Aristotle in arguing that the world of the Forms does not exist and, even if it
did, it would be meaningless for our present lives. Consequently, even 
though it is fundamental to bear in mind the possibility of deceit and the
necessity of using wisdom when making choices, I still consider the
instincts as something useful for me in order to obtain some knowledge, 
even on happiness. It is my ability to judge and to act using rationality and 
instincts together that will lead me into right or wrong decisions. If the
rational part always guides the irrational, then there will be some
psychological consequences: the irrational part must find its dimension. 
Since I regard the person as a unity, I prefer much more to think about the
importance of trying to find harmony between these two parts bearing in 
mind there is no supremacy of one over the other. 
In line with this, I want to underline the inconsistency of asserting 
that a fully fulfilled happiness can be only reached after death. This would 
mean postponing the problem of understanding what happiness is to a time
we are not able to verify or judge. If happiness exists, it must be possible to 
find it in this life, because this life is all we have and we are sure of. If we
cannot do that, than we should state that happiness is unreachable, avoiding 
categorizing two kinds of happiness, an inferior one (in this world) and a
superior one (after death). It would be more honest to maintain that
happiness does not exist at all, or it is not as perfect as one would expect. 
The claim that there is a perfect world fully knowable only after death is just
a palliative. The Aristotelian argument that contemplative happiness is
possible in this life, instead, is at least an attempt at responding to the
29 Drew Leder, ‘The Threatening Body’, in The Absent Body (Chicago: University of 




     
 
        
      
       
        
   
    
       
        
         
         
      
     
        
       
       
       
        
   
     
       
       
       
           
         
 
      
   
       
    
        
																																								 																				
            
   
problem. That is why I find it more acceptable, even if that particular 
experience is difficult to grasp, and maybe just a few people will reach it. 
Thus, Aristotle’s argument raises other problems: how about the
other people? Is complete happiness forbidden to them? Or if they will
practice virtues they will eventually reach it? Are there really some
objective standards to be met in order to reach happiness? Where is the
Golden Mean to be found?
These questions open up to the main problem of eudaimonia, namely 
the claim of objectivity. First of all, the idea of the Golden Mean seems to 
me a rather relative concept, a sort of expedient30 Aristotle uses when 
confronted with the fact that it is hard to state when one should follow the
instincts and when rationality, what virtues are and what is the right attitude
towards them. It is hard to try to give a standard for these matters, or 
consider them objective. Perhaps because they simply should not be. It
follows I do not concur with the idea that happiness is objectively reachable
practicing virtues. In fact, someone could live a virtuous life just because
society taught them it is right or to respond to someone else’s expectations, 
and yet not personally embrace those beliefs. In this cases, happiness does
not possibly derive as a consequence, because these behaviours would be
imposed, determining several psychological impacts (as, for example, 
frustrations). And yet, even if one lived following these values because of 
his convictions, I still do not trust he would be automatically happy. The
practice of virtues cannot directly lead to happiness, as in a cause-effect
system. If this were always the case, we would be like machines. Instead, 
we are human beings with a past that characterizes us, a present where we
can make decisions that will affect our lives, people around us that influence
our conducts, compromises we have to deal with. 
There is something these philosophers missed. They left out every 
individual’s singular story and subjectivity, the psychological and familiar 
background everyone carries. They left out the subconscious that inhabits
every man and that must be taken into consideration when talking about
‘good life’. Happiness is not objective because, as simple as it may seem, 
30 Kenneth Hamilton, ‘The False Glitter of the Golden Mean’, in Dalhousie Review, Vol. 




         
        
 





   
 
        
  
    
        
    
     
       
  
   
    
       
         





         
      
    
       
																																								 																				
         
 
we are all radically different, since before we were born. I believe the
account of the three Greek philosopher is defective inasmuch as it claims to 
be objective.
Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that there is a form of ‘subjectively 
objective happiness’, based on each singular knowledge and experiences. I 
will better clarify this thought in the last chapter of my dissertation. 
3. Christian philosophers: God is happiness.
Aristotle’s thought builds a bridge between the ancient Greek 
philosophies and the main Christian philosophers. When Christian religion 
enlarged the number of adherents gaining authority, becoming the official
religion of the Roman empire and the guidance of all social and cultural
movements, even philosophy came to be monopolised by its vision. Many 
philosophers challenged themselves in trying to prove the existence of God. 
The Christian God was supposed to be the core and the end of all
philosophical investigation. Hence, even when confronted with the matter of 
happiness, philosophers connected it directly to God. In order to illustrate
the Christian conception of happiness, I will briefly mention the thought of 
Saint Augustine, Boethius and Saint Thomas Aquinas. I will present them
rapidly, because a great part of their theories has its roots in Aristotle’s and 
Plato’s theorizations about virtues and eudaimonia, they only differ in the
final conclusions.
Saint Augustine
As we know by his Confessions,31 Saint Augustine lived many years
of his life seeking sensible pleasures. At some point, after meeting Saint
Ambrose, bishop of Milan, he converted: he slowly realized that only God 
could truly fulfil his personal, infinite desire. While all creatures get their 





       
 
       
    
       
         
   
      
      
    
      
  
       
     
   
       
      
       
     
        
     
  
         
      





     
   
																																								 																				
                
           
      
    
existence from God, existence and essence are one in God. For this reason, 
God must be the end of all philosophical quests. 
In his Confessions, Saint Augustine explains that men are deeply 
unhappy because they believe momentary joys can fulfil them, so they keep 
looking for happiness where happiness cannot be found. All human beings
seek for happiness and have an idea and insight of what it is, but since this
world is deceiving, we are tempted in pursuing transitory, and eventually 
disappointing, pleasures. It is our wrong disposition that forbids us to know
and find God: we are unhappy because we misplace our desire. Every 
human being, in fact, stretches out to God, whether aware of it or not, and 
therefore no material finite thing can be fulfilling. If we understand the
priority of seeking God over other things, directing the will through 
education towards a virtuous life, our soul will come to be ordered and 
harmonious. However, happiness can be truly complete only in the direct
contemplation of God after death. God is the meaning men cannot find in 
this world; God is therefore knowledge, truth and lasting happiness of the
soul. In a world of finite things, our desire is infinite, because our immortal
soul is bound to come to contemplate the infinite, and can find its natural
accomplishment only in God.32 Augustine makes clear, in fact, that even 
though he grasped the idea of true happiness, he could not be totally happy 
in this life because, as human being, he was constantly tempted to reach 
misleading joys.33 
We are not far, here, from the platonic view: Plato as well had placed 
real happiness in the intelligible world one can actually contemplate only 
after death. The only difference is in the ‘kind’ of God: the Christian God 
and the transcendent Platonic principle. 
Boethius
Following this path, it is important to mention Boethius’ conception. 
Boethius (who had translated some of Aristotle’s works) ended up in prison 
32 Jude Dougherty, ‘In pursuit of happiness’ in The World & I, 18(9), (2003), pp. 239-247.
33 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Happiness in Augustine’s Confessions’, in William E. Mann,
Augustine’s Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography, (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship




    
        
       
    
        
       
      
     
      
      
         
     
       
       
     
          
      
       





      
      
   
      
        
     
       
																																								 																				
       
         
         
 
  
after suffering many misfortunes. While prisoner, he wrote The Consolation 
of Philosophy,34 dedicating most of it to the attempt at demonstrating that
those who believe and have come to contemplate God cannot be unhappy, 
even if hit by many adversities. His dialogue with the character Philosophy 
leads us in the understanding of his consistent account of true happiness
(even though there seem to be different lines of argument in Philosophy’s
discourse): being the supreme and perfect good, happiness coincides with 
God. Therefore, even if the fortune changes, happiness cannot be harmed. 
Fortune, wealth, and attachments link us to this sensible world and they are
just imperfect goods. Thus, they are not components of true happiness, 
because happiness is of a completely different nature: it is eternal and 
inherently good.35 Again, only virtuous actions can lead us in the
accomplishment of contemplating God. Injustice exists because we are
sinners, and therefore we can be exposed to troubles, but a correct
understanding of providence (as ‘the unified view in God’s mind of the
course of events’)36 will make us truly happy. Indeed, the trials we are asked 
to face are a way through which we can be sanctified, coming to recognise
that God is the supreme good and primary source of love. Christ’s sufferings
on the cross for the atonement of sins provide the possibility for true
happiness to become a reality for sinners.
Saint Thomas Aquinas
We can now come to illustrate the last, and most important, Christian 
philosopher we will take into consideration, Saint Thomas Aquinas. He, 
better than anyone, bonded together Greek philosophy with Christian 
religion, especially in his masterpiece, the Summa Theologiae. In a section 
of this work he outlines a specific guidance for men in order to understand 
what happiness is and he illustrates the possibility of reaching it in this life. 
To such a purpose, Aquinas proceeds distinguishing two kinds of happiness:
beatitudo and felicitas. The complete happiness ‘would not be the last end, 
34 Ancius Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, (Penguin Classics, 1999).
35 John Marenbon, ‘Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of






        
     
 
 
         
           
       
           
         
          
         
  
 
    
 
     
      
           
       
 
          
      
      
   
     
    
       
  
        
     
																																								 																				
             
          
   
             
         
         
 
           
 
if something yet remained to be desired’,37 so it must be perfect. Since the
only perfect, uncreated and absolute good is God, true happiness (beatitudo)
corresponds to the direct contemplation of God. 
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some
created effect, knows no more of God than ‘that He is’; the perfection of
that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in
it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly
happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the
very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection 
through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s 
happiness consists.38 
Beatitudo can only be obtained after death, when our immortal soul
will be completely purified and freed from the body. 
‘Such an end lies far beyond what we […] can attain. For this
reason, we not only need the virtues, we also need God to transform our 
nature - to perfect or “deify” it - so that we might be suited to participate in 
divine beatitude’.39 In other words, the intervention of the divine grace is
needed in order to attain such a complete Vision.
In this life there are too many imperfects goods and evils we are
attracted to and tempted by. These limit us in our infinite desire for God (the
absolute Being our will can truly be satisfied by). What we can obtain in this
world, though, is an imperfect happiness, felicitas. Influenced by the
Ancient Greek tradition, Aquinas believed that we can reach a certain kind 
of happiness if we dispose of ourselves in trying to fully accomplish our 
nature as rational beings. This can be attained by pursuing the traditional
virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, justice, friendship, and the
theological virtues of faith, love and hope. Felicitas is the most we can 
achieve in this life. Softening down Augustine’s pessimistic vision that
37 John M. Connolly, ‘Aquinas on Happiness and the Will’, in Living Without Why: Meister
Eckhart’s Critique of the Medieval Concept of Will , (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 
2014), p. 90.
38 Thomas Aquinas, ‘Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine
essence?’, in Summa Theologiae, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
Part II.1, Question 3, Article 8, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947),
<https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FS/FS003.html#FSQ3OUTP1>.





     






     
       
   
 
      
 
       
 
  
     
 
   
 
     
   
      
  
         
      
     
       
   
      
       
     
        
     
sought the possibility of happiness exclusively after death, Aquinas
introduces Aristotle’s idea of happiness in this life, establishing a link 
between the two.
4. Considerations on the Christian philosophers’ accounts on happiness.
Most of the considerations on the Christian philosophers’ accounts
on happiness are in line with what maintained about the three Greek 
philosophers previously analysed. I therefore refer back to those arguments, 
namely:
- the inconsistency of postponing the possibility to achieve true happiness in 
a life after death;
- the absurdity of considering our senses as the only source of deceit and 
evil;
- the inconsistency of categorising two kinds of happiness;
- the impossibility of believing that a virtuous person subjected to 
misfortunes is happy no matter what;
- the impossibility of finding an objective answer when confronted with 
topics such as virtues and happiness. 
In addition to these arguments, there is something more to say 
related to the specific Christian vision. According to these philosophers, 
God is the answer to all questions, the solution to all problems, the
guarantor of any order. When confronted with the topic of happiness, they 
bring up God as a ‘great reassurance’. Since happiness is the most important
achievement in someone’s life, then it must coincide with the contemplation 
of the greatest entity, God. This affirmation could appear reasonable, from a
theoretical point of view. And yet it is not entirely satisfactory. This kind of 
reasoning sounds, indeed, too abstract and detached from our immediate
needs. It does not respond to our inner desire of finding happiness in this
world, in our daily life. It leaves us with a bitter taste in our mouth, like if 
we were referring to something which we cannot actually grasp. To what
use is, then, such a distant definition of happiness? My thought is that, since




     
     
      
       
      
    
      
      
        
      
      
      
      
      
    
      
      
      
      
         
        
        
         
   
 
             
           
         
     
     
 
																																								 																				
              
    
         
     
         
          
 
      	
philosophers relied on God as a powerful way to avoid the anxiety and 
confusion that would derive from a vision without certain guaranteed 
answers, without absolutes. As many centuries later Nietzsche argued, it is
hard to conceive and accept the possibility of God’s ‘death’,40 because this
would expose us to a state of uncertainty and chaos difficult to bear. In 
Nietzsche’s view, it is only by acknowledging the death of God (meaning, 
by it, not only a religious God, but all strong ‘myths’, such as morality, 
science, common sense etc.)41 that a man can really assume his
responsibilities towards life and come to give a personal meaning to it.42 By 
reporting part of Nietzsche’s thought I do not intend to endorse it entirely. I 
believe, though, that it is crucial to consider it in order to properly evaluate
the Christian account of happiness. Reflecting on Nietzsche’s ideas is a step 
to undertake, because it allows us to develop a critical open way of thinking 
on the troublesome matters of life. Taking for granted the existence of a
‘God-solution’, or relying too much on absolutes does not help us in 
honestly trying to find the right answers and to embrace the unpleasant
uncertainty that might derive from them. Surely Saint Augustine, Boethius
and Saint Thomas Aquinas did personally feel in their hearts the God they 
are referring to. However, I do not believe that assuming God as the only 
true answer could possibly help people who are not at that same stage in life
to find happiness. I do not aim to affirm that God does not exist or that God 
is not the answer at all. Only, I am of the opinion that an objective solution 
as ‘God is happiness’ cannot be exhaustive on a first instance. It is instead 
fundamental to examine each problem evaluating every possibility.
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers
to its questions […], but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich 
our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which 
closes the mind against speculation.43 
40 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of
Songs, translated by Walter Kaufmann (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010).
41 Peter Fritzsche, Nietzsche and the Death of God: Selected Writings, (Waveland: 
Waveland Press, 2013), pp. 8-14.
42 R. Lanier Anderson, Perspectivism, ‘Friedrich Nietzsche’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/nietzsche/>.




      
     
   
   
         
      
     
        
     
       
     
      
      
       
    
         




        
     




   
 
       
       
         
      
    
      
The discovery of God can be, for someone, one of the elements that
contribute in making them happy, or the completion of these elements, but
only after such a quest. God can be an answer, but it is not the answer.
Furthermore, I do not believe in an forever lasting happiness. The
possibility of reaching happiness is a long process that requires a positive
effort, thus it is not momentary either. I consider happiness as something 
that can be achieved and that might be weakened or strengthened depending 
on certain situations. It is not possible for someone to lose happiness in a
moment, nor to gain it in a moment. I rather think of happiness as a
progression that is never static, but always dynamic and that builds itself 
through time. As human beings, we can sometimes waste ourselves and find 
ourselves again, we can try to live according to our deepest desires and we
can feel disenchanted or with no hope in life. There is no moment of real joy 
that, once reached, we can know for sure will last. Happiness can be
undermined by external events, but not completely determined by these, not
even by the divine grace. It is therefore problematic to believe that without
God’s intervention we are bound to unhappiness, as this would mean that
we have no power over our lives and over our decisions.
In conclusion, I think the Greek and Christian philosophers’ mistake
was to expect happiness to be something perfect. My thought is that we
should lower our expectations on it: happiness is something to be nurtured 
every day, and that might change according to our attitude towards life and 
according to events. 
5. Happiness as absence of suffering.
It is starting with the examination of another Greek philosopher’s
thought, Epicurus, that I intend to introduce a different way of thinking
happiness. This conception takes on the idea that happiness is the greatest
goal in human life, and yet it detaches itself from the Aristotelian tradition 
when defining what happiness consists of. While in Socrates, Plato and 




    
         
   
        
         
      
   





      
       
  
     
      
      
      
      
     
         
        
  
      
      
       
        
      
    
																																								 																				
           
       
 
             
  
‘active’ one (implying the effort of becoming virtuous), for Epicurus
happiness is to be sought in the principle of ‘achieving the greatest pleasure
possible’. In other words, this corresponds to avoiding suffering. In fact, we
must not interpret the word ‘pleasure’ as ‘to get what one wants’. Instead 
‘pleasure’, for Epicurus, means to undertake a kind of life that permits us to 
live in a state of tranquility. We find similar theories in some Eastern 
philosophical tradition (especially Buddhism), which I will quickly outline
as a basis on which the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer built his
own conception on happiness.
Epicurus
Epicurus developed his philosophical theories bearing in mind the
thoughts of the great philosophers that preceded him, and he established his
own school, ‘The Garden’,44 in Athens. 
In order to understand his account on happiness, it is indispensable
to point out that Epicurus’ physics, metaphysics and ethics are strictly 
bound together and one discipline entails the others. He was essentially an 
atomic materialist, as he believed that everything, even men’s souls, is
composed of atoms that move in the void without any transcendent
principle’s intervention.45 Thus, another world after death does not exist nor 
does immortality: changes are simply due to the different movements of the
atoms. Gods do exist, but they live in a state of perfection and they are not
involved with humans’ lives nor concerned about men’s behaviours. 
From these premises Epicurus explains why men should not worry 
about the two major fears they are typically affected by, as these
apprehensions have no grounds: the fear of death and the fear for a divine
punishment. Since souls are made by atoms, death is only a material event
consisting of the separation of those particles. Once dead, men will not feel
pain nor live another life, they will simply stop existing as individual
44 Konstan, David, ‘Epicurus’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epicurus/>
45 George Colang, ‘Epicureism or a Philosophy of Pleasure’, in Philosophy, Social and




       
 
     
    
        
      
       
     
         
        
       
        
      
          
 
     
    
        
         
        
        
      
    
       
      
        
        
          
      
      
																																								 																				
           
     
               
 
  
           
entities. Moreover, since there is no world after death, there will not be
consequences such as punishments or rewards based on men’s actions. 
Through this formulation Epicurus aims at destroying the primary 
reasons for anxiety in life. Freed from these fears, men can start to think 
about how to attain happiness in this tangible life. Hence, freedom is the
lack of external coercion, and the first step towards happiness.46 The path 
men have to undertake is a philosophical one, which implies getting a
rational distance from any worries that would falsify reality causing 
unnecessary pain. This attitude will permit people to realise that a happy life
is one that maximises pleasure. Besides, happiness is the ‘ultimate
justification for ethical behaviour’,47 thus pleasure is the only intrinsic
good,48 and a virtuous action is conceived simply as a means to the
achievement of a happy (pleasant) life. In this context, justice is useful
because it reduces harm for everyone; it is not regarded as an intrinsic good, 
but as a means. 
About Epicurus’ notion of pleasure many misunderstandings are still
circulating. In fact, by ‘pleasure’ Epicurus did not mean the achievement of 
a full enjoyment of all bodily and mental desires. His theory is somehow
just the opposite of this shallow interpretation: the greatest pleasure for men 
has to be found in the lack of suffering. Epicurus underlines the fact that
there are different kinds of pleasures, not all of them worth satisfying:
natural and necessary pleasures (in line with the human nature and 
necessary for happiness, namely living in a state of tranquility), natural but
not necessary pleasures (as, for example, desiring a delicious food; these
should be avoided as they imply attachment to external things), not natural
nor necessary pleasures (for example the desire of a certain social position, 
which should be eluded as it brings troubles). ‘We may recognize that not
all pleasures are to be chosen at all times, since some immediate pleasures
may lead to long-term pain or harm’.49 Suffering is often the result of the
affection to material goods and emotions. As a matter of fact, if one is in 
46 Epicurus, Principal Doctrines and Letter to Menoeceus, translated by Robert Drew Hicks
(CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014).
47 Adam Barkman, ‘Was Epicurus a Buddhist?’, in Florianópolis, v. 7, n 2, Dec. 2008, p.
290.
48 ibid.




    
        
        
   
    
      
  
  
         
    
 
      





       
       
        
    
     
      
      
       
 
     
       
																																								 																				
           
     
            
         
          
     
            
          
 
love he is immediately exposed to jealousy and fear of losing the loved 
person. Or, if one aims at gaining a certain social position, he will probably 
become ambitious and restless. These are all conditions in which one
experiences a certain kind of suffering, namely the impossibility of finding 
peace. Only when freed from all these attachments can men truly flourish by 
experiencing freedom of the body from pain (aponia) and of the soul from
suffering (ataraxia).50 ‘This state is also called static pleasure, because it is 
thought to arise from the stable atomic structure of our souls’.51 The
happiest man is the one that tries to become accustomed to a simple way of 
life, minimising desires and finding real pleasures in natural and necessary 
things.
Happiness though, for Epicurus, is not a private matter: friendship 
among people who share the same meaningful goal is the best way to inspire
others in pursuing it. 
Buddhism
A very similar idea on happiness is represented by the Buddhist
conception. Siddhârta Gotama was the son of one of the kings of Northern 
India, and as such he was meant to become king one day. Yet his destiny 
brought him into another direction. In fact, once having seen the ‘Four 
Signs’,52 he came to understand what suffering (dukkha) was (aging, 
sickness and death) and he also became aware of the possibility of escaping 
this through a long process of meditation and attainment of wisdom. That is
precisely why he abandoned his kingdom and he started his path as ‘the
Enlightened One’, looking for a way of escaping suffering permanently. 
While acknowledging the Hindu notions of karma and samsâra (the cyclic
process of rebirth)53 and the idea that the greatest good consisted in being 
50 Epicurus, Principal Doctrines and Letter to Menoeceus, translated by Robert Drew Hicks
(CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014).
51 Ad Bergsma, Germaine Poot, Aart C. Liefbroer, ‘Happiness in the garden of Epicurus’ 
in Journal of Happiness Studies, 9(3), (2008), pp. 397-423.
52 The ‘Four Signs’ were: an old man, a sick person, a corpse being carried to cremation 
and a holy man in meditation.
53 Mark Siderits, ‘Karma and Rebirth’, in ‘Buddha’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of





    
     
       
    
       
       
       
         
     
      
        
      
     
           
       
       
        
        
      
        
     
        
       
       
    
     
 
         
       
         
																																								 																				
        
   
          
   	
 	
             
able to break free from suffering and samsâra, he oriented himself on an 
opposite track when confronted with what to achieve this escape meant. 
While in the Hindu tradition the enlightenment was conquered with the full
realization of the atman (the self) as manifestation of Brahman in the
substantial things, the Buddha sought this enlightenment in an opposite
concept, the anatman, ‘no-self’.54 The belief in the individual self as a
unitary entity distinct from others implies the attachment to personal needs, 
affections and ownings (to what is ‘mine’). All these things are the primary 
source of suffering and frustration. ‘Under the influence of habitual
tendencies, we perceive the exterior world as a series of distinct, 
autonomous entities to which we attribute characteristics that we believe
belong inherently to them’.55 This ignorance leads us into a mistaken 
conception of reality. Indeed, ‘when we explore the body, the speech, and 
the mind, we come to see that this self is nothing but a word, a label, a
convention, a designation’.56 In the Buddhist tradition the self (this ego’s
deception that must be unmasked) cannot be found in the body nor in the
consciousness, being just a flow which does not last. The self has therefore
no consistence. One must accept the denial of the self, intended as a singular 
and unitary subjectivity with specific desires to satisfy. Once one comes to 
perceive himself not as a substantial entity, but as something interdependent
with others and with the environment, the ‘individual self’ is completely 
extinguished. When this occurs it is possible to reach nirvana: a full
tranquility, the dissolution of all desires. Nirvana is the real permanent
happiness, a complete avoidance of suffering, it is the acceptance of 
‘nothingness’ (as nothing exists in itself, everything is flux, relation). The
process of liberation from suffering starts with the awareness of being ‘no-
self’, that nothing endures changeless.
In his sermon of the Four Noble Truths,57 the Buddha presents the
acknowledgments one should get to in order to undertake the process that
leads to true happiness: 1) life is suffering; 2) suffering is nothing but the
54 Richard Taylor, ‘The Anattā Doctrine and Personal Identity’, in  Philosophy East and
West, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 1969), pp. 359-366.
55 Matthieu Ricard, ‘A Buddhist view of Happiness’, in Journal of Law and Religion, 29, 
no. 1 (2014), p. 14. 
56 ibid., p. 22. 




     
      
      
       
     
       
        
        
       
       
     
    
      
     
       





        
    
     
       
       
          
     
       
        
 
																																								 																				
          
  
          
         
 
       
result of men’s ignorance and longing for something or growing toxic
emotions; 3) it is necessary to eliminate toxic desires in order to reach 
nirvana; 4) to do so it is essential to acquire wisdom and to meditate, 
improving some mental practices that purge the mind of venomous
emotions. ‘In brief, we must: recognize suffering, eliminate its source, and 
end it by practicing the path’.58 Through these practices, one can still feel
physical pain, but one cannot inwardly suffer, because pain does not disturb 
someone’s mental state of tranquility. Suffering is a state of mind, thus the
mind has power over it. Not all emotions are harmful, but only those which 
obstruct the process of freedom from suffering. The emotions of serenity 
derived from a wise and peaceful state, for example, are good. ‘If an 
emotion strengthens our inner peace […] it is positive or constructive’.59 
It is now possible to infer the main difference between the Buddhist
conception of happiness and the Epicurean one: nirvana does not
correspond to the enjoyment of the lack of suffering in a peaceful life; it is, 
instead, the liberation from the ‘samsaric trap’ and from dukkha, the
extinction of suffering, desire and of the sense of the self.
Schopenhauer
We can ascribe to this school of thought a 19th century philosopher, 
Arthur Schopenhauer.60 Indeed, the German philosopher took on some of 
the Hinduist and Buddhist’s assumptions on happiness, pushing them
towards a very pessimistic theorization. He claimed to be a ‘truth seeker’ 
and that, although truth is painful, one must recognize it and accept it, 
insofar as it is the only way we can avoid false illusions that are either a
product of ignorance or would cause, at some point, even more suffering. 
We can derive Schopenhauer’s ideas on happiness mainly thanks to his
essay The Wisdom of Life61 from his final work Parerga and Paralipomena,
where he indicates the guidelines for living the most tolerable life possible. 
58 Matthieu Ricard, ‘A Buddhist view of Happiness’, p. 18.
59 ibid., pp. 19-20.
60 Robert Wicks, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/schopenhauer/>.




      
       
      
       
  
    
       
           
     
      
       
    
    




     
  
     
   
 
																																								 																				
            
   
          
       
      
  
The German philosopher reckons that human fulfilment would be in 
the complete realization of all our desires and in the complete avoidance of 
all our sufferings. However here an obstacle arises, which is inherent in the
human nature, in the nature of the Will:62 as a matter of fact, once men 
satisfy their desires, they suddenly get bored and wish for something new. A
state of complete and permanent realization never occurs. Moreover, the
assertion that happiness is just to be seen in the absence of suffering would 
contradict the true nature of human beings, since desire has a central role in
it. Our Will aims to accomplish our desires, and the impediments we find on 
that way generate sorrow. Suffering originates from the interferences
between the will and its momentary target. Nevertheless, once the goal is
reached, boredom makes its way through: ‘it is impossible to satisfy the 
will, and we are determined to walk the hedonistic treadmill endlessly. […] 
We are doomed to swing between pain and boredom’.63 That is why the
attempt to find a stable happiness is bound to be frustrated, because
happiness is nothing but an illusion.
Because happiness as a persistent state does not exist, the best way 
for men to live their lives is to reduce suffering. There is no point in 
constantly trying to seek for something that has no consistence, living 
between longing and boredom. That is why, according to Schopenhauer, we 
should not pursue our deepest desires. The most tolerable life is the one in 
which we make do with simple things, like avoiding pain and emotions, 
limiting our expectations, pursuing basic needs. ‘A painless state is the 
closest we can get to happiness’,64 although this does not correspond to a
happy state. I believe that, by distinguishing ‘absence of suffering’ and 
‘happiness’, Schopenhauer makes an important point I agree with, that
shows the inconsistency of Epicurus’ and the Buddhist’s accounts.
Schopenhauer intends to provide us with some specific guidelines in 
order to reach this painless state. I will quickly mention some of them. First 
of all, there are three aspects that determine men’s condition: personality 
62 Robert Wicks, ‘The World as Will’, in ‘Arthur Schopenhauer’, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
63 Rozemarijn Schalkx, Ad Bergsma, ‘Arthur’s advice: comparing Arthur Schopenhauer’s
advice on happiness with contemporary research’, Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, 







       
       
       
  
 
        
       
        




         
 
 
        
       
       
    
      
       
        
      
        
       
																																								 																				
 	
and health, belongings, social position. Personality and health should be 
taken into great consideration when planning to reach ‘the happiest life 
possible’: one needs to take care of who he is (of his inclinations), to be 
true to himself and, in order to do so, one must be healthy too. It is not 
possible to be cheerful and ill or weak at the same time. 
Schopenhauer explains that superior mental ability helps to
prevent tedium and keeps people from pursuing passions that lead to 
problems. We have to take our character into account and should only do 
things that suit it.65 
Wealth and fame, as well as a respected social position, are not
important in order to attain the happiest life possible. We only need what is
enough for us to survive and nothing more: the more money we have the
more attached to it we are and the more linked to suffering we are bound to 
be. Another piece of advice Schopenhauer gives us is that solitude is better 
than company, for dealing with people implies suffering. Believing the 
contrary would mean to be optimists, and optimism is just another illusory 
belief. 
6. Considerations on the accounts on happiness intended as absence of 
suffering.
In order to present some considerations on the accounts on happiness
intended as ‘absence of suffering’, I believe it is firstly important to point
out the completely different approach of these accounts in respect of the
previous ones considered in this dissertation. If Socrates, Plato, Aristotle
and the Christian philosophers saw in happiness the necessity of an active
implication of the individuals, the view on happiness as just ‘absence of 
suffering’ does not require it. No active search is implied, rather a passive
acknowledgement of what we truly need, with a consequent estrangement
from all sources of potential pain, until the extreme of the ‘nothingness’ of 





    
      
       
  
        
          
   
   





       
      
          
    
      
   
   
      
     
    
        
      
      
        
      
     
         
 
      
      
     
research and a personal determination in trying to become better people, the
‘absence of suffering-happiness’ springs from a process of progressive
awareness that the cause for unhappiness is exactly in that research and in 
that determination. 
Given these two opposite conceptions, it is required to take a side, 
as one alternative excludes the other. The success of a philosophical quest
lies in the capacity of being completely open, trying to get rid of 
preconceptions or excessive intellectual loops. Now, to comprehend which 
option seems to be the most reasonable, we ought to make some
considerations on the human nature. 
On solitude
To start with, let us ponder Schopenhauer’s claim that is better to 
live in solitude than in company. It is hard to support such a hypothesis, for 
various reasons. The main one is the simple fact that almost the majority of 
people live in relationships (friendships, working or familiar relationships). 
Would men have continued to live in such a relational condition for all these
centuries if they had experienced they were better off living alone?
Absolutely not, they would have chosen another lifestyle. And is it even 
possible for people to live a completed isolated existence? Well, to a certain 
extent, yes, and such an existence may have its virtues (for study, meditative
reflection and self-analysis). However, that one could live such an existence
over length periods of time is questionable as we are so reliant on 
others. This lends support for the inconsistency of Schopenhauer assertion. I 
believe Schopenhauer’s mistake, when arguing so, was to not be able to 
recognise that his personal negative feeling towards a relational condition 
was probably dictated by bad experiences of his life. However, this is not an 
acceptable general answer. On the contrary, men are social beings, and 
dealing with other people is a trait that marks them. As such, a social
dimension must be taken into consideration as part of happiness too. 
Epicurus considered human relationships vital insofar as they are
among people with similar philosophical goals. However, I believe there is a




     
       
        
     





    
         
      
     
         
      
   
       
      
      
 
         
          
   
      
        
         
        
    
     
       
         
       
       
																																								 																				
       
relationship and at the same time to avoid any sort of attachment, hopes, 
angers, love? We can clearly see there is a contradiction in terms. The kind 
of happiness Epicurus talks about does not take into consideration the reality 
of facts. The complete state of inner tranquility could, in theory, be possible
only without any contact with other human beings. However, as we have
demonstrated, this cannot possibly be considered a happy state.
About passions and desires
The ancient Greek tradition and the Christian tradition distinguished 
two kinds of desire: a positive one (that guides man into living a good life
by actively pursuing virtues and eudaimonia), and a negative one (that is
irrational and guided by senses). As argued before, I do not agree to such a
distinction. However, at this stage it is not relevant to probe once again into 
these topics. What matters here, though, is a wider conception of passions
and desires, for which either they are to take into account or to avoid. 
According to the ‘absence of pain-happiness’ accounts it is the active
attitude that derives from any passion which has to be circumvented, 
inasmuch as activity implies desire, desire implies attachment and 
attachment implies suffering. 
Now, is it true that by minimising desires we maximise pleasure? Is
it true that by pursuing basic needs we can avoid suffering? Is it realistic to 
believe that by extinguishing the ‘individual-self’ we find real freedom?
I propose here to enlarge what I argued in chapter 2 about irrational
passions and desires to all human drives and strives. If, on the one hand, it is
true that some pain might originate from these, and that the attachment to 
certain feelings is wrong, on the other hand this is a constituent part of our 
nature. As Schopenhauer noticed,66 we are constantly striving for 
something, whether this is something material or the ‘good life’, ambitions
or practicing virtues. It is this tension that characterizes us as human beings, 
whether we like it or not. Given this, is it reasonable to claim that the
solution is to minimise these strives? This would correspond, from my point
of view, to argue that since human nature entails some suffering, we should 




     
      
       
    
     
  
       
     
        
   
       
   
 
  
     
      
    
  
 
        
            
    
       
   
     






            
    
try to be ‘less human’. Since men are bound to suffer to a certain extent, 
happiness can only be found in trying ‘not to be men’. However, this
argument appears clearly implausible. And yet I believe that these accounts
on happiness are maintaining something similar, just in ‘more acceptable’ 
terms. Believing that to eradicate desires is a solution, or even conferring to 
it the status of happiness seems to me problematic. 
Therefore, as desires and feelings are part of the human nature
intrinsically, they cannot be set apart when reasoning on happiness. A
passive happiness is just not happiness. Schopenhauer has the merit of 
having understood and underlined this. The consequences in his
theorizations are then extremely negative (namely that happiness does not
exist at all) and he does not provide us with a positive. Nonetheless, I 
believe he had at least the courage to truly analyse mankind, facing the fact 
that happiness is neither something objectively reachable nor a simple 
‘absence of suffering’. Moreover, he stresses the importance of taking care 
of individual inclinations and personality, which, I reckon, is the starting 
point on the way for happiness. Also, I partially agree with his idea that a
state of complete fulfilment and satisfaction is not possible for men. 
Nevertheless, I still think happiness is possible. Perhaps Schopenhauer 
expected happiness to be something perfect, something completely 
fulfilling, and this was his mistake. 
Desiring, trying to pursue what we feel we are called to and what we
love: this is the essence of our nature. To cut this out means to blow out the
flame of life in us, becoming indifferent to things around us, anesthetized 
towards pain, but towards joy, love and life too. As the Russian writer 
Dostoevsky wrote, ‘we can only truly love suffering, or through it’.67 
Suffering is a necessary step in order to grow, to love, to live. It is part of 
the deal. It is part of our human nature. And we can learn to love suffering 
and even to come to consider it part of our happiness. 
67 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, White nights; A gentle creature; The dream of a ridiculous man, 






      
      
        
        
 
       
     
 
        
      
         
         
       
         
      
      
       
      
   
   
        
      
          
     
      
																																								 																				
          
          
            
            
       
 
          
         
 
           
	
About the self
Silencing our most intimate drives would result into a neutralization 
of ourselves as human beings, which is exactly what the Buddhist theory of 
‘no-self’ indicates as the right path. Let us then consider the hypothesis of 
the dissolution of the individual self as a way of becoming free from this
ego’s deception. 
In the history of philosophy the personal identity, what we call ‘self’, 
has been questioned many times and in different ways, not only in the
Eastern tradition. Descartes’s distinction between mind and body ended up 
in conferring to the mind the real primate as true self of the individuals.68 
Locke’s interpretation of the self as psychological continuity69 is another 
example, or the materialist view that maintains we are nothing but atoms
that move into space.70 I must also mention the discourse on the subject that
starts from Nietzsche and stretches out until the post-structuralists, for who 
the subject is nothing but a mere convention, while the true identity of an 
individual is unstructured and pluralistic: the subject is therefore
deconstructed.71 As we have seen, even the Western tradition questioned the
subject as such, in different terms. The self seems to be an entity difficult to 
define. And yet, is the self really something that cannot be considered as an 
entity at all, something constantly shifting between different states or 
something constructed by society?
The objection I want to raise to this hypothesis is that, as much as I 
do recognise that it seems hard to define the kind of entity my ‘self’ is, I do 
intimately feel that I am a self. I am a subject different from other subjects, 
and I feel this as true, with no need for further investigations on this matter. 
I do perceive my ‘self’. And I do not find reasons to doubt what I perceive
68 René Descartes, Meditations [1641], in Key Philosophical Writings, translated by
Elizabeth S. Haldane, ed. by Enrique Chavez-Arvizo (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997).
69 Matthew Kapstein, ‘Review: Collins, Parfit, and the Problem of Personal Identity in Two
Philosophical Traditions: A Review of “Selfless Persons” and “Reasons and Persons”’, in
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 36, No. 3 (University of Hawai'i Press, Jul., 1986), <
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398781>, pp. 289-298.
70 William Ramsey, ‘Eliminative Materialism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/materialism-eliminative/>.





    
      
       
         
         
           
      
       
        
       
        
 
 
       
       




      
 
 
        
 
       
   
 
																																								 																				
       
 
           
   
	
so clearly as something veracious.72 I agree with the post-structuralists’ 
claim that the self is contradictory and fragmented. And yet, even after the
deconstruction of the subject, I undoubtedly feel there is something left that
resists, a personal core that constitutes who I am. I might not be a unitary 
subject, but I am a self. As much as puzzling, my personal thoughts are the
proof that there must be a center of consciousness that is more than a mere
collection of mental events and that is not possible to dissolve. After 
deconstructionism, the idea of a sovereign subject fell apart. The subjects
turns out to be a complex and not cohesive entity, difficult to describe and 
examine. As the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan states: ‘I am where I 
am not thinking and if I think where I am not’,73 but still, I add, I am
something. 
I therefore disagree with the Buddhist hypothesis of ‘no-self’, as well
as I disagree with the idea of happiness as ‘absence of suffering’. I rather 
think of a complex nature of the self, which includes suffering and a
positive possibility of finding happiness. 
7. Happiness as ‘the greatest good to the greatest number’:
Utilitarianism.
At this point in the discussion, we can somehow infer a connection 
between Epicurus’ theory and another school of thought, Utilitarianism, 
whose belief is that happiness coincides with the maximisation of pleasure
and the minimisation of pain for the greatest number of people. Their 
conception of pleasure, though, differs.
72 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Bibliotech Press, 2014), pp. 97-
104.






     
     
      
        
     
     
        
        
       
 
     
       
      
       
       
      
    
    
     
   
      
      
       
   
      
         
       
            
																																								 																				
          
    
           
        
 
        
            
       
 
 	
Utilitarianism is an ethical teaching rooted in Jeremy Bentham’s
works74 that spread and became established in the British philosophical
culture of the 19th century, in particular thanks to J.S. Mill’s theorization.75 
We can define Bentham and Mill’s accounts as the major contributions to 
the Classical Utilitarianism, as thereafter many other philosophers built on 
their ideas some new conceptions of Utilitarianism. In the Utilitarian 
classical account, general happiness is the only thing that has an intrinsic
value, and it is the condition in which the overall of pleasure (intended as a
psychological state in which one ‘feels good’) prevails over the amount of 
pain. 
This conception has a long tradition in the history of philosophy:76 
Bentham has the merit of having extended this belief as an interpretative
criterion in ethics, economy and law: that simple principle that everyone can 
understand and experience (pleasure-pain) is the only principle that makes it
possible to objectively estimate the norms on which we should base our 
civil life. Indeed, his attempt at founding such a theory started with his
desire of social reform by changing inadequate, corrupt laws. ‘For Jeremy 
Bentham, what made them bad was their lack of utility, their tendency to 
lead to unhappiness and misery […]. If a law or an action doesn’t do any 
good, then it isn’t any good’.77 
As we can understand by these premises, a central aspect involved in 
the Utilitarian doctrine is consequentialism, for which it is possible to 
evaluate the ‘utility’ of a conduct only by its consequences. Actions are
good if they contribute to happiness, thus they can be estimated depending 
on the positive outcomes they have in terms of pleasure or pain. Therefore, 
actions have no intrinsic value: they are just instrumentally right or wrong.78 
Laws too are not indisputable, hence they can change depending on the
social situation: ‘a law that is good at one point in time may be a bad law at 
74 Paul J. Kelly, Utilitarianism and distributive justice: Jeremy Bentham and the civil law, 
(Oxford University Press, 1990).
75 Christopher Macleod, ‘John Stuart Mill’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/mill/>.
76 John Troyer, The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill, (Hackett Publishing, 2003). 
77 Julia Driver, ‘The History of Utilitarianism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of






        
    
       
        
   
     
        
      
     
      
          
     
        
       
       
            
        
 
   
      
 
        
       
        




        
           
          
 
           
     
            
                 
     
           
	
some other point’.79 This conception is the main difference in respect of 
other accounts on morality (not only the Aristotelean and Cristian accounts, 
but also the natural law’s theory80 or Kant’s ethics,81 for which an action 
must be always esteemed in itself and must be chosen because of its
rightness, regardless of the consequences). 
According to Utilitarianism the greatest happiness, though, is not to 
be interpreted in an egoistic way, rather right the opposite: one must take
into consideration not only his own personal happiness, but also that of 
others. The criterion to establish the rightness of an action is to find a
balance between individual’s happiness and that of the community.82 If my 
personal happiness deprives someone else of it, than that is not a complete
happiness. A man can only be happy in a happy community. From an ethical
point of view, the agent should therefore choose those conducts that
promote the major happiness possible for the largest number of people or, to 
use Bentham’s formulation, the promotion of a ‘fundamental axiom, it is the
greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and 
wrong’.83 The principle of utility becomes therefore the most important
moral principle.
Moreover, according to Bentham, the value of pleasure (and 
happiness) can be measured, since it is determined by some specific
parameters: intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity, purity and 
extent.84 These parameters are the standards one should be directed by, 
helped by the guidance of experience. Since it is possible to ‘calculate’ 
happiness it will be consequently possible to also promote a certain kind of 
morality even in other disciplines, such as law and economy, and this was
precisely Bentham’s initial aim.
79 ibid.
80 Robert P. George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, (Clarendon Press, 1994). 
81 Robert Johnson, Adam Cureton, ‘Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/kant-moral/>.
82 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Courier
Corporation, 2012), pp. 2-3.
83 Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government’,
ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (London:
Humanities Press, 1977), p. 393.





        
      
       
      
      
     
  
 
       
       
         
        
     
        
        
        
     
   
        
   
      
     
            
     
     
 
     
    
       






To sum up Bentham’s idea: pleasure and pain are the parameters that
indicate what is good and they establish a posteriori which conducts can be
considered right or wrong; the principle of utility becomes therefore the
founding principle of moral theory and behavior. As a result, the evaluative
moral criterion has to be based on the positive (happy) or negative
(unhappy) consequences of our actions. These consequences must be judged 
according to their utility, namely if they produce benefits, welfare and 
happiness for individuals and for the community. 
J.S. Mill, despite being one of his followers, recognised that some
objections could be raised against Bentham’s theorization. Mill thought that
the main limit of Utilitarianism could be seen in the fact that Bentham’s idea
of pleasures was too calculative, leaving out consciousness as well as moral
evaluations. As a matter of fact, Bentham had maintained that the only 
differences among pleasures are quantitative ones (the parameters we
mentioned just above), not qualitative. Hence his view implies that simple
pleasures, as sensory ones, are of the same intrinsic value as intellectual
ones. To avoid possible critiques on this matter, Mill broadened the
utilitarian views introducing a qualitative consideration on pleasures, 
showing that there are different kinds of pleasures, some of which are more
desirable and fitting for the human nature than others. Thus, according to 
Mill, intellectual pleasures have more value than sensory pleasures. He
proved this by claiming that those who have experienced both pleasures
prefer the first ones. ‘Or, to use his most famous example - it is better to be
Socrates ‘dissatisfied’ than a fool ‘satisfied’.’85 This supremacy accorded to 
intellectual pleasures allowed Mill to somewhat open Utilitarianism to other 
opposed schools of thought.
After Mill many others (like, in particular, Sidgwick)86 refined the
utilitarian theory pushing it into different directions or better defining some
peculiar concepts. In the context of this work on happiness though, it will be









        
    





      
     
     
     
      
      
          
        
      
      
      
  
       
         
       
        
      
       
     
         
 
     
      
																																								 																				
             
   	
8. Considerations on the Utilitarian view on happiness.
I believe this school of thought leaves room for various legitimate
critiques, not only by opposed philosophical approaches but within 
Utilitarianism itself. In this work, I shall confine myself to making some
comments just related to the sphere of happiness. 
About the possibility of measuring pleasure
The first concept that captured my attention as basically impossible
to accept is Bentham’s idea that pleasure, and consequently happiness, can 
be measured based on some parameters. Even assuming these can be some
guidelines in order to evaluate pleasure, is anyone really able to esteem, for 
example, the duration of their pleasure, or its certainty? These cannot be
possibly conceived as objective criteria on which to calculate the precise
amount of pleasure, just because pleasure is not a neutral data (as, for 
example, the temperature in a room is). Pleasure and happiness are much 
more evanescent and abstract concepts, they are subjected to a series of 
variables one cannot compute. Furthermore, men cannot always act thinking 
about the consequences of pain or pleasure their actions will cause. Or even 
if they did, they could do it acting against their feelings. For example, if I 
thought I should not leave a job because I might be unemployed afterwards, 
but I hate that job, how do I judge what is best to do? Can I really find an 
objective answer pondering about the consequences? The assumption that a
man’s decision must be just based on a rational evaluation is not
conceivable. Every person has different demands that cannot be easily 
subjected to rational preferences.87 The idea that happiness can be calculated 
sounds very much pretentious and quite impersonal. Happiness and life
must be more than a simple measurement between pleasure and pain. As we
are not machines, calculation is a term that does not fit our nature. 
Moreover, the calculation of pleasure balanced among all people is a 
tricky notion. How will I be able to objectively judge when my happiness
87 Amartya Sen, ‘Welfare, preference and freedom’, in Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 50,




      
     
        
      
         
        
         
      
    





   
     
        
     
     
     
    
    
      
   
       
        
         
         
      
         
      
     
																																								 																				
           
  
affects someone else’s? If my friend and I aspire to the same job position, 
should I avoid competing with him/her? Indeed, if I got the job this might
compromise my friend’s happiness, but if I did not get it this might
compromise my happiness. Hence, am I really able to foresee and choose
the action whose effect would secure the greatest pleasure for both of us? Is
it then possible to enlarge this concept to the greatest number of people? I 
do not think so. From this example it is evident that the Utilitarian aspiration 
is utopian, it could maybe work in theory, but then reality is much more
complicated, and each case works differently. Even assuming that we could 
measure our personal pleasure, it would still not be clear how to fit this in 
the notion of a communitarian ‘average’ happiness. 
About the risk of overestimating quantity over quality
And again, even given so, would it be reasonable to look for an 
‘average happiness’ of the overall, instead of taking care of one’s personal
happiness? I believe the greatest happiness for the greatest number can be
only met when everyone looks first for their own happiness, not in an 
egoistic way. Only when I take care of myself, can I reach a state in which I 
will be of help even for others, I will build a better community with my 
behavior. The idea of a happy community can only stand if individuals try 
their best in order to find their individual happiness first. According to the
philosopher John Rawls, the Utilitarian thought ends up legitimising some
individuals’ sacrifice in order to obtain major advantages for the collectivity 
in general.88 In the Utilitarian system the correct decision coincides to a
mere matter of ‘efficient administration’: individual differences are thus not
safeguarded.89 The fact is that a plurality of people with different aims, life
plans and needs is the substantial characteristic of any society. That is why 
even though Utilitarianism might seem coherent in itself it cannot work, 
because it does not face the reality of society. The extension to a collective
dimension legitimises the violation of the fundamental freedom and rights
of individuals and it ignores the disparity in the distribution of happiness: 
88 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 231.




       
       
      
        
    
       
         
   





    
      
        
      
      
    
      
       
   
     
     
       
         
       
        
      
  
   
																																								 																				
          
    
the risk is to overestimate quantity over quality. One of the consequences of 
this reasoning might be that everyone would end up living a bearable life, 
but no one would live a fully happy life. In fact, the economist and 
philosopher Amartya Sen’s argues that the individual pleasure can be
influenced by mental conditioning and by adaptation. Desires can change
adapting to circumstances and ambitions can be scarce just because one
thinks only about those actions that are considered feasible in the context
they are in.90 Nonetheless, these are not true desires nor true happiness. 
I totally agree with Rawls and Sen’s views and I believe the problem
of Utilitarianism is that it describes men and society too simplistically. 
About the risk of relativism
Finally, I reckon the theorization of consequentialism is open to the
risk of relativism. To argue that the worth of an action depends only on its
effects is quite a strong assumption, because it implies the impossibility of 
judging an action itself just as right or wrong. Here many objections have
been raised against Utilitarianism, because this statement implies several
moral problems. In fact, if I rob a rich person that is exploiting other people, 
then it seems my action is justified because of its good outcomes. Or, is it 
right to bomb civilians in war in order to subvert a tyranny? If I know that
by doing something ‘apparently’ wrong I will guarantee a good 
consequence, then I should be allowed to do it. And yet I feel a conflict
when reflecting on these possibilities. These moral conflicts are something 
Utilitarianism does not consider, but actually they are vital to social life, 
ethical progress and moral integrity. It seems to me impossible to assert that
we should judge an action by its effects only. To bomb civilians is always
wrong, no matter the consequences. There are some actions that are just
right or wrong intrinsically. To affirm the opposite would open to a radical
relativism, for which everything can be allowed. According to the English 
philosopher Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism potentially authorises even the
90 Amartya Sen, ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’, in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 76, no. 




       
    
           
 






      
   
       
         
          





       
  
        
     
       
     
     
        
     
        
           
																																								 																				
           
       
worst actions if the welfare of individuals is safeguarded.91 However, which 
consequences can be evaluated as objectively positive and according to 
who? These notions risk being too vague. It is evident how all this leads us
in a vicious circle with no end. 
It is in light of all these considerations that I believe the Utilitarian 
account on happiness cannot be accepted as a valid one. 
9. Conclusions
After having analysed some of the most important philosophical
accounts on happiness and after having presented their strengths and their 
weaknesses, in this final chapter I will try to sum up all these considerations
so as to delineate what I believe to be a possible right account of happiness. 
To such a purpose I will first list the characteristics that are not related to 
happiness, in order to come up with a positive definition of what happiness
can actually be.  
What happiness is not
1) Happiness does not correspond to enjoyment or to a temporary state of 
pleasure. It is not perfect, everlasting or eternal either.
I believe that everyone, at least at first, aims to find a state of 
complete fulfilment in life, in which all desires are accomplished. And yet, 
when confronted with the fact that such a state is not achievable, many 
people give up on expecting this kind of happiness and fall back on 
something that seems immediately satisfactory but that, in the long run, is
not: pleasure and enjoyment. My thought is that both of these attempts are
fallacious inasmuch as they do not take into consideration human nature for 
what it is. Believing that happiness corresponds to a perfect and complete
fulfilment does not take notice of the fact that men are not perfect, they are
91 Bernard Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in George Sher, Ethics: Essential





   
         
        
 
         
         
       
    
 
 
       
  
         
          
     
     
        
        
        
     
  
 
        
 
         
        
      
        
     
       
    
 
 
lacking something which cannot be filled with anything wholly. Thus, 
trying to reach such a state will lead to frustration and major unhappiness. 
Only by acknowledging the fact that a perfect happiness is not accessible
not because people are incapable of reaching it, but just because of human 
nature, one can find a way towards true happiness. 
On the other hand, it is not just because a perfect lasting happiness
does not exist that we have to search for it in momentary pleasures. One
could try to live shifting from a brief state of enjoyment to another, but this
would be very tiresome and dissatisfactory. We are called to something 
more, we feel the need for something more. 
2) Happiness does not correspond to ‘lack of suffering’ nor can it admit
adaptation.
It is not possible to believe in a ‘negative’ account of happiness
because it leaves out what characterizes us the most: our desires. If we had 
to avoid completely suffering we would have to live in solitude and learn to 
get rid of feelings, emotions, desires. As shown in this dissertation, this does
not make sense as it would lead us into an aseptic kind of life which would 
make us less ‘human’. Furthermore, adaptation is not acceptable as a
solution: if one adapts himself in order to live a bearable life, he has already 
given up on trying to find true happiness, which implies always a positive
tension towards what is good.
3) Happiness is not objectively reachable, not through the practice of 
virtues nor by measuring the amount of pleasure. 
As maintained before, it is not suitable to believe that if we put into 
practice a set of virtues we would objectively end up being happy. We are
not machines, we do not work in terms of ‘objectivity’. For the same reason, 
we cannot measure our pleasure. We should not make the mistake of 
aspiring to fully classify man into categories, because even if this gives us a
sense of stability towards the frightening uncertainties of life, it does not
respond to our inner questions. Absolutes cannot be taken for granted as




            
 
     
    
    
      
     
     
   
        
        
        
      
  
 
        
 
      
      
   
        
      
    
          
        
      
  
    
 
 
         
  
       
       
4) True happiness is not reachable only after death nor it only coincides
with God.
When people are challenged by the difficulty of reaching a perfect
happiness in this world, the alternative of falling back on temporary 
pleasures is to rely on an ‘after death’ happiness, on a ‘beyond world’. Since
I cannot be completely fulfilled in this world, this realisation must be
possible after death. Again, these ‘myths’ have the authority of giving a
powerful answer to what seems to be unanswerable, placating our sense of 
confusion and dismay. However, if we had to postpone the matter of 
happiness until after death, then we should have to admit that there is no 
possible happiness in this world. And yet, we cannot have any certainty of a
possible ‘beyond-world’. Thus, it is not wise to rely on it, as well as God 
cannot be considered the answer to every question. This is an abstract
reasoning far from our immediate needs. 
5) There are not two kinds of happiness, a superior one and an inferior
one, as well as the rational part is not superior to the irrational one. 
In line with what was just said, some philosophers tried to soften 
down the idea that happiness was reachable only after death by 
contemplating two kinds of happiness, a superior one (after death) and an 
inferior one (in this life). The inferiority of such happiness is due to the fact
that the rational part of our soul can be compromised by our senses. 
Nevertheless, once again, it is through my senses, besides my rationality, 
that I get to know the world I am in. Hence, it is problematic to believe that
rationality is superior to senses, as well as it is implausible to categorise
different kinds of happiness. The solution does not correspond to minimise
desires in order to maximise pleasure, nor to consider irrationality and 
senses inferior to rationality, trying to suppress the former in favour of the
latter. 
6) The Buddhist theory of ‘no-self’ is not acceptable, nor is it the
Utilitarian idea of an ‘average happiness’ for the greatest number.
When thinking about myself I always conceive me as a subject




   
      





        
 
   
           
   
       
        
    
  
 
         
 
       
       
      
    
 
        
   
 
 
      
 
      
         
    
      
subjectivity and acceptance of being ‘no-self’ simply contradicts my most
immediate feeling. In line with this, an average happiness for the greatest
number is not adequate either, inasmuch as it does not take notice of the
individual differences.
Characteristics of happiness
1) True happiness is a process of human flourishing and it is a composite
of different elements.
Happiness does correspond to human flourishing, even though it never 
reaches a state of perfection, insofar as it allows us to live a better life, one
in which we can find serenity in doing what we love, respecting others. 
Human flourishing implies a dynamic progression: it is not permanent when 
reached, it requires a constant positive tension, because it can be
strengthened or weakened according to external events or inner feelings.
Happiness is a composite of different elements.
2) True happiness requires an active attitude and it involves desires and 
feelings, as well as rationality.
Happiness requires an active philosophical attitude and a process of 
personal analysis. It involves a tension towards our deepest desires, towards
a self-knowledge, towards the understanding of what is good or bad for us
and for others. In this light, even suffering can become an essential part of 
happiness, a necessary step in order to better understand ourselves. Feelings, 
emotions and desires are part of human nature, thus they are involved in the
process of happiness. Avoiding suffering by distorting human nature does
not help at all. 
3) Happiness is everybody’s absolute end. There is a ‘subjectively-
objective’ happiness.
Our past and our psychological life do affect our awareness of what
virtues are and of what happiness is. There are always differences from
individual to individual. With the purpose of finding happiness, we need to 




          
      




        
        
    
        
        




         
      
      
   




         
         
          
 
 
         
         
           
           
the fact that happiness is for everyone the absolute end. It is intrinsically 
desired, not as a means to an end. Starting from this acknowledgement, even 
though an objective account on happiness for every person does not exist, I 
believe a ‘subjectively-objective’ happiness is possible. 
4) Happiness is possible in this life.
We must admit that, even though the thought of a possible complete
happiness after death comforts us and gives us hope, we have no proof that
it actually exists. Moreover, when living our lives, we are not primarily 
concerned with what will happen when we will be dead. This life and this
world are what we are sure of and what we are primarily concerned about. 
Thus, the kind of happiness men are looking for must be reachable in this
world.
5) Happiness arises from harmony.
The person is a unity, thus only a harmony between the parts of the soul
can guarantee happiness. Rationality and senses allow us to get some
knowledge and desires are the essence of our nature, while suffering and 
deceit do not contradict the possibility of being happy. 
Also, we are social beings, and thus we need to live in a harmonious
society. 
6) Happiness is ‘personal’.
Since I might be a puzzled self, but I am something, happiness must
be related to this something that I am. Happiness is always personal, it takes
into account the individual differences and inclinations. In this respect it is
interesting to consider the thought of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan
It is this subjective singularity, not egoistic individualism, which
separates us from the ‘herd’[…]. Lacan’s emphasis on what is singular,
what cannot be counted, what organizes an enjoyment that cannot be




       





      
       
 
  




    
 
         
 
      
     
        
     
        
        
      
       
        
      
      
     
																																								 																				
           
             
  	
              
        
 
constitutes the most important challenge posed by psychoanalysis to the 
reigning discourses of happiness and wellbeing.92 
Happiness
It is only by acknowledging the intrinsic characteristics of a human 
being that we can come to delineate a possible answer on happiness. As
discussed, men:
• are not perfect, they are in a condition of lack93 
• have desires and passions
• ought to find harmony between rationality and senses
• look for happiness in this life
• are sociable beings
• are very different one from the other.  
I will now attempt to define what happiness is and how we can try to 
reach it in this life.
Happiness is a progression of self-knowledge which derives from
having experienced what is good or bad for us personally in the various
situations of life we find ourselves in and it does entail suffering and the
possibility of making mistakes. This self-analysis process starts with the
awareness of what meaningful people in our lives and the society we were
born in did about us (e.g. I acknowledge that my parents rose me in a
Catholic tradition. I acknowledge that I was bullied when I was a child, and 
so on). Once recognised so, I can decide to do something about what others
did about me, conscious of the fact that my past is so singular and different
from all other people’s that I cannot look for absolutes in order to respond to 
my personal subjective questions. This process continues with the
understanding of my inclinations and deep desires, which are the essence of 
92 Colin Wright, ‘Happiness Studies and Wellbeing: A Lacanian Critique of Contemporary
Conceptualisations of the Cure’, in Allan Apperley, Stephen Jacobs, Mark Jones, ed. by,
Theme: Therapeutic Cultures, vol. 6 (2014), p. 810. 
93 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 2: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and





       
     
        
   
      
      
    
       
          
      
 
        
       
      
       
     
    
     
          
       
     











              
          
who I am and what I want. The attempt should always be aimed at directing 
myself in a right tension towards my true desire, trying to find a harmony 
between rational and irrational drives. The true desire is the ‘purest’ one, not
driven by other forces (as, for example, the feeling of satisfaction that can 
derive from meeting someone else’s expectations; the temptation of 
adaptation; the attraction to material objects; escapism). The true path 
corresponds with getting rid of all ‘non-pure’ desires, by recognising when 
these links are still very strong and by being able to let them go. In doing so, 
I have to be aware of the only moral law which stands the test of objectivity:
not to hurt anybody, or at least to try to do so in the way my knowledge
enables me, nourishing the possibility of a harmonious society. 
This is a process of honesty, where I become aware of the puzzled 
being that I am and, most importantly, I accept that I will never have
comprehensive answers and I will never be completely fulfilled nor know
what the perfect conduct exactly is. Following Jacques Lacan’s thought:
‘The search for meaning is therefore endless, for one cannot find any 
ultimate meaning that will be absolutely fulfilling, in sex, religion, or 
anything else, since the human being is founded in loss and separation’.94 
And yet this is not to be seen in a negative light: this ‘imperfection’, this
lack is precisely what enables us to revamp our desire, which is what makes
a life worth living. Therefore, even though not perfect, happiness does exist, 
and it consists in staying true to our ‘objective subjectivity’, directing 
ourselves towards our pure desire, in the attempt of not hurting anyone.
94 Roger Horrocks, ‘Lacan: Lack and Desire’, in Campling J. (eds) An Introduction to
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